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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
J. Rodney Johnson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The General Assembly enacted legislation dealing with wills, 
trusts, and estates that added or amended a number of sections of 
the Virginia Code in its 2001 Session. In addition, one Supreme 
Court of Virginia opinion and three Virginia Circuit Court opin-
ions raised issues of interest to the general practitioner as well as 
the specialist in wills, trusts, and estates during the period cov-
ered by this review. This article reports on all of these legislative 
and judicial developments.1 
II. LEGISLATION 
A. Decedents' Estates-Notice and Copies of Inventories and 
Accountings, and Wills 
House Bill 1195, carried over from the 2000 Session, sought to 
introduce modest informational provisions into Virginia probate 
law in favor of beneficiaries of decedents' estates. 2 As amended 
and enacted by the 2001 Session,3 this legislation adds section 
* Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law. 
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Virginia Code sections, they will 
often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated, 
those section numbers will refer to the latest printing of the old sections and to the 2001 
supplement for the new sections. 
2. H.B. 1195, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000). This bill is briefly discussed in J. 
Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 34 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 1069, 1080-81 (2000). 
3. H.B. 1195, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 15, 2001, 
ch. 265, 2001 Va. Acts 217) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.§§ 26-12.4, -32 (Repl. 
Vol. 2001), § 64.1-122.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001)). 
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26-12.44 to the Virginia Code to require personal representatives 
filing inventories or accounts to mail copies to entitled parties5 on 
or before the date these documents are filed with the commis-
sioner of accounts. 6 To ensure recipients a minimum amount of 
time within which to act upon the requested information, and to 
help enforce the notice provision itself, the commissioner is pro-
hibited from approving an inventory or account until twenty-one 
days after its receipt and unless the inventory or account: (1) 
states that all requested copies were mailed; (2) shows the date of 
mailing; and (3) shows the names and mailing addresses of the 
addressees. 7 To ensure that recipients are informed of the com-
missioner's actions on an account and to advise them of the time 
frame within which they may object, section 26-32 was amended 
to require the commissioner of accounts to send a copy of the 
commissioner's report and any attachments (except the account 
itself) to any entitled parties who make a written request for the 
report. 8 In addition, the commissioner must advise the recipients 
that the report will be automatically confirmed by law fifteen 
days after its filing with the court unless they file objections.9 Fi-
nally, to ensure that interested persons are advised of the forego-
ing rights, section 64.1-122.2, which deals with notice of probate 
and qualification in decedents' estates, was amended to add a 
summary statement of these rights to the official form that per-
sonal representatives or proponents of wills must send to those 
entitled to notice thereunder.10 
One further aspect of House Bill 1195, as originally introduced 
4. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-12.4 (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
5. The parties entitled to such copies are the same persons who are entitled to re-
ceive notice of probate, VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-122.2(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001), except for 
intestate takers in a fully testate matter and beneficiaries who receive their bequests be-
fore the documents are filed with the commissioner of accounts, provided these persons 
make a written request to the personal representative for the copies. Id. 
6. Id. § 26-12.4(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001). This right to receive also applies to copies of af-
fidavits of intent to file a statement in lieu of an account at a later date and copies of any 
documents making changes to previously filed ones. Recipients are not, however, entitled 
to copies of any supporting vouchers, and a request does not entitle a person to copies of 
filings made before the request is received by the personal representative. Id. 
7. Id. § 26-12.4(B) (Rep!. Vol. 2001). 
8. Id. § 26-32 (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
9. Id. 
10. Id.§ 64.l-122.2(C)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2001). This amendment also requires the notice 
to include the mailing address of the commissioner with whom any required inventory or 
account will be filed. Id.§ 64.1-122.2(C)(6) (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
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in the 2000 Session, was a requirement added to section 64.1-
122.2 that personal representatives automatically send a copy of 
any will to everyone entitled to notice thereunder.11 This provi-
sion did not appear in the 2001 version that was initially passed 
by the House,12 but a Senate amendment (later accepted by the 
House) added ineffectual language apparently intending to give 
those persons entitled to request copies of inventories and ac-
counts the further right to also request a copy of any will.13 This 
drafting error is best understood by first examining the primary 
purpose of the legislation-to give entitled parties a right to cop-
ies of inventories and accounts. The first step in this process, as 
noted above, was the enactment of the new section 26-12.4 to im-
pose a duty upon personal representatives to send such copies 
upon request. The second step was an amendment to section 
64.1-122.2 to advise persons receiving notice of probate of their 
rights to such copies. Unfortunately, the "will-copy'' amendment 
fails to contain the required first step. Without imposing a duty 
upon the personal representative to send a copy, it simply advises 
affected parties of their (non-existent) right to receive a copy of 
the will from the personal representative. This error should not 
cause any immediate problem, however, because the bill applies 
only to "estates of persons dying on or after July 1, 2002."14 Thus, 
remedial action can be taken in the 2002 Session. At such time, it 
is respectfully suggested that, instead of cleaning up the "right to 
a copy'' approach taken by the Senate amendment, the Common-
wealth would be better served by going back to the original ap-
proach taken in the 2000 Session's version of House Bill 1195. 
Under that approach, personal representatives automatically 
send a copy of any will to everyone entitled to notice of probate 
under section 64.1-122.15 
Lastly, it needs to be noted that although the General Assem-
bly has now addressed the due process concerns that have existed 
in the probate area for too long, the present legislation leaves 
11. H.B. 1195, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000). 
12. H.B. 1195, Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. 
Sess. 2001). 
13. The two amendments referring to copies of wills are found in section 64.1-
122.2(A), which introduces the four categories of persons entitled to notice of probate, and 
section 64.1-122.2(C), which states the information to be contained in the notice. VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 64.l-122.2(A), -122.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
14. Va. H.B. 1195 (Reg. Sess. 2001). 
15. Va. H.B. 1195 (Reg. Sess. 2000). 
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much undone. The General Assembly's failure to impose compa-
rable notice requirements upon testamentary trustees, conserva-
tors of incapacitated persons, and guardians of minors perpetu-
ates the long-standing patent unconstitutionality in these areas 
of law.16 
B. Non-Probate Transfers-Non-Testamentary 
A certain tension has long existed in the law between docu-
ments that are clearly inter vivos or clearly testamentary in op-
eration and inter vivos documents containing donative provisions 
designed to become effective at one's death. A recent example of 
the latter is found in Zink v. Stafford, 17 wherein Father sold par-
cels of real estate to four persons, taking back promissory notes in 
three cases that were made to "Father and Daughter or the sur-
vivor," and in the fourth case a note made to him individually but 
later endorsed over to "Father or Daughter or the survivor."18 
When Daughter claimed these notes upon Father's death, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia held that "the survivorship language on 
each note was an abortive testamentary act and not a gift. "19 In 
response to the problem presented in Zink and other cases, the 
General Assembly, in its 2001 Session, added new section 64.1-
45.3 to legitimatize non-probate transfer at death provisions con-
tained in virtually every inter vivos writing by declaring them to 
be non-testamentary.20 This new section is, mutatis mutandis, a 
copy of Section 6-101 of the Uniform Probate Code, whose draft-
ers stated that "[t]he sole purpose of this section is to prevent the 
transfers authorized here from being treated as testamentary. "21 
16. For a discussion of the constitutional issues involved, see J. Rodney Johnson, The 
Absence of Due Process in Fiduciary Accounting: A Constitutional Concern, VA. BAR AsS'N 
J., Fall 1997, at 11. 
17. 257 Va. 46, 509 S.E.2d 833 (1999). For further discussion of Zink, see J. Rodney 
Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1075, 1097 (1999). 
18. Zink, 257 Va. at 49, 509 S.E.2d at 833. 
19. Id. at 51, 509 S.E.2d at 836. 
20. VA. CODE.ANN.§ 64.1-45.3 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
21. UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 6-101 cmt. (amended 1989), 8 U.L.A. 431 (1969). 
2001] WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
C. Joint Property-Survivorship-Securities' Accounts-
Presumption of Convenience 
849 
The "presumption of convenience" was a judicial doctrine for-
merly applied to deposit accounts in financial institutions, pursu-
ant to which a person depositing funds in a financial institution 
in the depositor's name and that of another (not the depositor's 
spouse), jointly, was presumed to have placed that other's name 
on the account solely for the depositor's convenience, i.e., so that 
the other might have access to these funds for the depositor's 
benefit if the depositor became ill or was otherwise unable to per-
sonally attend to the depositor's banking business.22 This pre-
sumption was repealed when the 1979 Session adopted uniform 
multiple party account legislation.23 
Unfortunately, the presumption of convenience resurfaced in 
the recent case of Buck v. Jordan, 24 wherein the Supreme Court 
of Virginia held that, although the presumption had been re-
pealed vis-a-vis deposit accounts in financial institutions, it was 
applicable to investment accounts in investment corporations.25 
The problem thus created may be illustrated with the following 
hypothetical. If Father purchases specific stock and has it titled 
"Father and Daughter as joint tenants with the right of survivor-
ship," they will own the stock equally during their joint lifetime, 
and Daughter will become the sole owner at Father's death. How-
ever, if Father opens an investment account titled in the same 
exact language, Father will own the entire account during their 
joint lifetime, and it will be an asset of bis estate upon bis death. 
Thus, as a result of Buck, ownership and survivorship rights in 
securities cases will be determined by whether the parties elect to 
have certificates of stock issued, or have the certificates held in 
an investment account-an unsupportable distinction. Accord-
ingly, House Bill 1731 amended section 55-20.1 in order to pre-
22. This doctrine is more fully discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Joint, Totten Trust, 
and P.0.D. Accounts: Virginia Law Compared to the Uniform Probate Code, 8 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 41 (1973). 
23. Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 407, 1979 Va. Acts 596 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 6.1-125.1 to -125.16 (Repl. Vol. 1999)). The presumption of convenience in joint 
account cases was replaced with a presumption of survivorship by VA. CODE ANN.§ 6.l-
125.5(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999) . 
24. 256 Va. 535, 508 S.E.2d 880 (1998). Though recognized, the presumption was re-
butted in this case, which is commented upon in Johnson, supra note 17, at 1095-97. 
25. See Buck, 256 Va. at 541-42, 508 S.E.2d at 883. 
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vent the presumption of convenience from arising in this, or any, 
context in the future. The amendment provided that when any 
realty, personalty, or written memorial of a chose in action26 is 
"titled, registered, or endorsed in the name of two or more per-
sons 'jointly,' as 'joint tenants,' in a 'joint tenancy,' or other simi-
lar language," the parties will own the property as joint tenants 
without survivorship. However, if "the expression 'with survivor-
ship' or any equivalent language" is added thereto, "it shall be 
presumed that such persons are intended to own the property as 
joint tenants with the right of survivorship as at common law."27 
In addition to this primary purpose, House Bill 1731 further 
clarified the law of concurrent estates by moving the language 
applicable to tenancies by the entireties formerly found in section 
55-20.1, entitled "Joint ownership in real and personal property," 
into a new section 55-20.2, entitled "Tenants by the entireties in 
real and personal property; certain trusts."28 Finally, House Bill 
1731 also amended section 55-21, which deals with exceptions to 
section 55-20, to provide that its provisions are applicable to all 
fiduciaries, instead of only executors and trustees, and promis-
26. The term "written memorial of a chose in action" was added to the statute because 
of certain language in Pitts v. United States, 242 Va. 254, 408 S.E.2d 901 (1991), a case 
concerned with survivorship rights under section 55-21 "'when it manifestly appears from 
the tenor of the instrument' creating the tenancy that survivorship was intended to be an 
attribute of the estate." Id. at 260, 408 S.E.2d at 904 (citation omitted). The Supreme 
Court of Virginia held that section 55-21 "intended to apply to joint tenancies and to ten-
ancies by the entireties created by an 'instrument' of conveyance or devise. The promissory 
notes executed by the partnership are not such instruments. They did not create a tenancy 
by the entirety; they are memorials of a chose in action." Id. Thus, in order to ensure that 
the presumption of convenience would not be resurrected in the context of promissory 
notes, the 2001 Session added the term "written memorial of a chose in action" at this 
point in section 55-20.1 and inserted "memorializing the existence of' in section 55-2l's 
opening sentence, viz., "[s]ection 55-20 shall not apply to any estate which joint tenants 
have as fiduciaries, nor to any real or personal property transferred to persons in their 
own right when it manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument transferring such 
property, or memorializing the existence of a chose in action." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-21 
(Cum. Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). 
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20.l (Cum. Supp. 2001). This amendment further provided 
that "[t]his section is not applicable to multiple party accounts under§§ 6.1-125.1 through 
6.1-125.16, or to any other matter specifically governed by another provision of this code." 
Id. 
28. Id.§ 55-20.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001). To complete this clarification, this legislation also 
moved the last sentence of Virginia Code section 55-21, also dealing with tenancies by the 
entirety, into new Virginia Code section 55-20.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
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sory notes that only memorialize a chose in action instead of cre-
ating property.29 
D. Testamentary Trusts-Waiving Accounts-Inventories 
The General Assembly, in its 1993 Session, added section 
26-17. 7 to Virginia probate law in order to permit a testator to 
expressly waive the statutory obligation of a testamentary trustee 
to account before the commissioner of accounts. 30 The primary 
purpose of House Bill 1733,31 enacted by the 2001 Session, was to 
amend section 26-12 to provide that, if a testator waives the re-
quirement to account, the trustee "shall be exempted from the 
duty to file an inventory for so long as there remains no duty to 
file annual accounts."32 
In addition, House Bill 1733 also amended the section dealing 
with account waiver in a most unusual manner. As originally en-
acted, subsection 26-17. 7(A) (hereafter "A:') of the 1993 legislation 
regulated waiver of accounts for wills probated after June 30, 
1993,33 and subsection 26-17.7(D) (hereafter "D") regulated 
waiver of accounts for wills probated prior to July 1, 1993.34 For a 
testator's waiver to be effective under A, the trustee must give 
certain notices and information to entitled beneficiaries within 
ninety days of qualification and make annual accounts to any of 
these beneficiaries that request them.35 For the testator's waiver 
to be effective under D, the trustee need only obtain written con-
sent from the entitled beneficiaries.36 A rather obvious problem 
29. Id. § 55-21 (Cum. Supp. 2001). See supra note 26, for a discussion of the concept of 
"memorializing a chose in action." 
30. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 689, 1993 Va. Acts 969 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
.ANN.§ 26-17.7 (Repl. Vol. 1997)). A provision also allowed for waiver of the obligation to 
account in testamentary trusts created before the effective date of this legislation if the 
will contained a waiver provision, and all adult beneficiaries who may be entitled to re-
ceive principal or income from the trust consent thereto. See J. Rodney Johnson, Annual 
Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 833, 840-41 
(1993). 
31. H.B. 1733, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 8, 2001, 
ch. 73, 2001 Va. Acts 48) (codified as amended at VA. CODE .ANN.§ 26-17.7 (Repl. Vol. 
2001)). 
32. VA. CODE.ANN.§ 26-12(C) (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
33. Id.§ 26-17.7(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
34. Id.§ 26-17.7(D) (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
35. Id.§ 26-17.7(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
36. Id.§ 26-17.7(D) (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
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arose in a certain number of post-June 30, 1993 trusts governed 
by A when the trustees, upon first consulting counsel some 
months following their qualification, were informed that the tes-
tator's waiver provision could not be honored because the trustee 
had failed to give the required notices and information within 
ninety days as mandated by A. In response to this problem, 
House Bill 1733 amended D in a manner that transforms the 
failure to comply with the ninety-day notice requirements of A 
from a fatal to a relatively inconsequential matter. This trans-
formation was accomplished by replacing the requirement in D 
that wills governed by D be probated "prior to July 1, 1993" with 
"whenever probated," and then generally (though not exactly) im-
porting the notice and information requirements of A into D.37 
The practical effect of this amendment was to allow the trustee 
of a post-June 30, 1993 trust, who unwittingly (or intentionally) 
failed to comply with A, to nevertheless qualify for waiver under 
subsection D, which now substitutes the entitled beneficiaries' 
consents for the former ninety-day notice requirement. Thus, the 
trustee who is aware of the ninety-day rule may now decide to ig-
nore it and qualify under D which, unlike A, has no further provi-
sion requiring the trustee to make annual accounts to any of the 
entitled beneficiaries that request them. Although the goal of this 
legislation does not seem unreasonable, one wonders why this bit 
of statutory legerdemain was employed to reach it. If the ninety-
day rule was proving too harsh, why not address it directly by an 
appropriate amendment to A-instead of permitting the avoid-
ance of A by an amendment to D?38 Lastly, House Bill 1733 also 
made two relatively minor amendments to subsections 26-17. 7(A) 
and ( C) dealing with the waiver of accounts. 39 
37. Id. 
38. While commenting upon the drafting in this portion of the bill, it should also be 
noted that the amendments to subsection D gratuitously inserted "an inventory or" in its 
opening sentence, which now reads "Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, any 
trustee under a will of a decedent containing the requisite waiver, whenever probated, 
shall be relieved of the duty to file an inventory or annual accounts .... " Id. No reference 
to waiver of inventory should be made in a section whose title talks only about waiver of 
accounts and, most importantly, such language is absolutely unnecessary. The amend-
ments to section 26-12 already provided that trustees who do not have to account under 
section 26-17. 7 do not have to file an inventory. Id.§ 26-12(C) (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
39. These two changes are: (1) The class entitled to the required written notices in 
§ 26-17.7(A) was changed from adults "who may then be entitled to receive income or prin-
cipal from the trust," to adults "other than the trustee ... to whom income or principal of 
the trust could be currently distributed," and (2) the provision in§ 26-17.7(C) permitting 
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E. Personal Representatives-Settlement of Accounts-Statement 
in Lieu 
Although the general rule of Virginia probate law contemplates 
that personal representatives of decedents' estates will file peri-
odic accounts,40 section 26-20.1 provides that if all distributees of 
an intestate estate or residuary beneficiaries under a will are also 
personal representatives, they may file a statement in lieu of 
making the required account.41 The required provision in this 
statement, that the estate has been distributed "after the time 
required by law," has been somewhat troublesome throughout 
this section's history because there is no such "time required by 
law" in any of the laws of the Commonwealth.42 The first of the 
2001 amendments to this section ended this uncertainty by re-
placing the ambiguous phrase with "six months have elapsed 
since the personal representatives qualified in the clerk's office."43 
Another question has been whether a personal representative 
that is a residuary beneficiary and who is also the trustee of a 
trust was meant to have the benefit of this section; that question 
was given a negative answer by the second amendment.44 
Another concern developed from this section, which provided 
that a personal representative who was not able to make the re-
quired statement by the time an account was due might simply 
file a notice with the commissioner that the required statement 
"will be filed when all requisites of this section have been met."45 
AB there was no limit on the number of such notices that might be 
filed, a number of years might pass before any estate paperwork 
beneficiaries to demand that an account be filed notwithstanding a testator's waiver, was 
enlarged to permit such a demand notwithstanding a beneficiary's prior consent to waiver. 
Id.§§ 26-17.7(A), (C) (Rep!. Vol. 2001). 
40. Id.§ 26-17.5 (Rep!. Vol. 2001). 
41. This statute requires that this statement recite "under oath that all known 
charges against the estate have been paid, and that after the time required by law, the 
residue of the estate has been delivered to the distributees or beneficiaries." Id. § 26-20.1 
(Cum. Supp. 2000) (prior to amendment). 
42. However, the Attorney General has opined that '"After the time required by law' 
refers to a period determined reasonable by the commissioner of accounts in light of gen-
eral law governing creditors' rights and the particular circumstances of the case." 1983-84 
op. Va. Att'y Gen. 474. 
43. VA. CODE.ANN.§ 26-20.l(A) (Rep!. Vol. 2001). 
44. "For the purposes of this section, the term 'residuary beneficiary' shall not include 
the trustee of a trust that receives a residuary gift under a decedent's will." Id. 
45. Id. § 26-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000) (prior to amendment) 
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arrived in the commissioner's office, thereby increasing the oppor-
tunity for accidental or intended wrongs to be left undetected. Ac-
cordingly, the third amendment required personal representa-
tives filing a notice of intent to file a statement at a later time to 
include therein "an explanation of why such a statement cannot 
presently be filed," and it also authorized the commissioner to re-
quire the filing of an interim account if the commissioner deter-
mines that the proffered explanation is not sufficient.46 The 
fourth amendment authorized the commissioner to charge a $75 
fee for examining a notice of intent to file a statement, which is 
the same amount allowed for examining the statement itself. 47 
F. Spendthrift Trusts-Ceiling Removed-Child Support 
Exception 
The ceiling on the amount that may be held in a spendthrift 
trust, thereby immune from most claims of a beneficiary's credi-
tors, and which was increased from $600,000 to $1,000,000 just 
three years ago,48 was completely removed by the 2001 Session.49 
However, this same legislation also provided that "no such 
[spendthrift] condition shall operate to the prejudice of a judg-
ment against a beneficiary for the support of the beneficiary's 
child."50 
G. Non-Probate Payments-Adjustments 
Over the years, the General Assembly enacted numerous pro-
bate-related statutes that contain references to specific dollar 
amounts. It is the destiny of any such statute to decline in signifi-
cance as inflation decreases the actual value of the specified 
amount. Responding to this problem, as well as providing a cer-
tain upgrading of these statutes, the General Assembly increased 
the amounts in a number of these statutes.51 
46. Id.§ 26-20.l(B) (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
47. Id.§ 26-20.l(C) (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
48. Act of Apr. 2, 1998, ch. 214, 1998 Va. Acts 329 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 55-19 (Cum. Supp. 2000)). 
49. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-19(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
50. Id. 
51. Although inflationary adjustment was one argument behind these increases, all 
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1. Probate Avoidance-Small Estates 
The Virginia Code contains a number of statutes designed to 
facilitate the transfer of specific kinds of property from the dead 
to the living without requiring the recipients to go through the 
probate process. These statutes are permissive in nature and, al-
though they fully protect the transferor who elects to rely upon 
them, a potential transferee cannot force their use. A further 
common denominator in most of these statutes has been a re-
quirement that the value of the property in question not exceed 
$10,000. This ceiling has been increased to $15,000 in the follow-
ing instances: (1) certain sums due decedents from the Common-
wealth, the United States, labor unions or employers;52 (2) corpo-
rate securities owned by the decedent;53 (3) sums due deceased 
trust or estate beneficiaries;54 ( 4) sums due deceased inmates of 
state mental institutions;55 (5) sums due deceased patients of 
municipally operated health care facilities;56 and (6) personal 
property belonging to nonresident decedents.57 
2. Small Estates Act 
The Virginia Small Estate Act58 has provided for an affidavit-
based personal property collection process in estates where the 
value of the entire personal probate estate does not exceed 
$10,000.59 The 2001 legislation increased this ceiling to $15,000.60 
but two of these sections were increased from $5,000 to $10,000 in 1996 and, while Vir-
ginia has not experienced 50% inflation since that time, these same sections are now in-
creased to $15,000. The 1996 increases are discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Sur-
vey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1249, 1254-56 (1997). 
The discussion in the following text is taken from this source, with appropriate modifica-
tions, but without traditional attribution. 
52. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-123 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
53. Id. § 64.1-123.l (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
54. Id. § 64.1-123.3 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
55. Id. § 64.1-124 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
56. Id.§ 64.1-124.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
57. Id.§ 64.1-130 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
58. Id. §§ 64.1-132.1 to -132.4 (Rep!. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2001). For a discussion 
of this Act as originally enacted, see J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 68 VA. 
L. REV. 521, 529-30 (1982). 
59. Id.§ 64.1-132.2 (Cum. Supp. 2000). 
60. Id. § 64.1-132.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
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3. Homestead, Exempt Property, and Living Allowance 
The General Assembly, in its 1981 Session, enacted compre-
hensive legislation governing the rights of a decedent's spouse 
and children to exempt property and allowances.61 The 2001 
amendments increased the homestead allowance from $10,000 to 
$15,000,62 the exempt property allowance from $10,000 to 
$15,000,63 and the personal representative's authority to award a 
living allowance from $12,000 to $18,000 if payment is made as a 
lump sum, and from $1,000 to $1,500 monthly for one year if 
payment is made on a periodic basis.64 It should be noted that the 
living allowance amount is not a limitation upon the amount of 
this entitlement, which remains a "reasonable allowance,"65 but 
only a limitation upon what can be disbursed without court ap-
proval.66 
H. Incorporation by Reference-Questionable Legislation 
Generally speaking, the common law term "incorporation by 
reference" refers to "[a] method of making a secondary document 
part of a primary document by including in the primary document 
a statement that the secondary document should be treated as if 
it were contained with the primary one."67 Virginia common law 
imposes the following three conditions upon the employment of 
this concept: 
(1) the document [to be incorporated] must be a paper in actual exis-
tence at the time of the execution of the will; (2) it must appear from 
the face of the will that it is a paper in actual existence; and (3) it 
must be identified and described with reasonable certainty in the 
will.68 
61. Act of Mar. 22, 1981, ch. 580, 1981 Va. Acts 897 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 64.1-151.1 to -151.6 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2001)). For a discussion of this Act 
and its background, see J. Rodney Johnson, Support of the Surviving Spouse and Minor 
Children in Virginia: Proposed Legislation u. Present Law, 14 U. RICH. L. REV. 639, 646-
52 (1980)), and Johnson, supra note 58, at 521-25. 
62. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-151.3 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
63. Id.§ 64.1-151.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
64. Id.§ 64.1-151.4 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
65. Id.§ 64.1-151.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
66. Id.§ 64.1-151.4 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
67. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 770 (7th ed. 1999). 
68. Thrasher v. Thrasher, 202 Va. 594, 603, 118 S.E.2d 820, 825 (1961) (citing Law-
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In Virginia there is one statutory exception to the requirements of 
this doctrine,69 and two superficially similar but different matters 
that need to be distinguished therefrom.70 Against this back-
ground, a number of questions arise in connection with the Gen-
eral Assembly's enactment of section 64.1-45.2.71 
less v. Lawless, 187 Va. 511, 518, 47 S.E.2d 431, 434 (1948)). Although these cases refer to 
outside papers to be incorporated in wills, there is no reason to believe that the rules 
would be any different if the recipient paper was something other than a will. 
69. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57 (Cum. Supp. 2001) (listing boilerplate fiduciary pow-
ers that may be wholly or partially incorporated into a trust or will by reference thereto). 
Whereas the common law rule permits only presently existing writings to be incorporated 
into another, this section provides that "unless the will or trust instrument expresses a 
contrary intention, the incorporation by reference of powers enumerated by this statute 
shall refer to those powers existing at the time of death." Id. § 64.1-57(4) (Cum. Supp. 
2001). 
70. In 1995 the General Assembly added section 64.1-45.1 to the Virginia Code, which 
legitimated the concept of a testator's post-will list to dispose of items of tangible personal 
property, and declared that "except as provided herein, [this section] shall not otherwise 
affect the law of incorporation by reference." Id. § 64.1-45.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 
2001). Notwithstanding the General Assembly's mention of"incorporation by reference" in 
this statute, it does not involve this concept for a rather obvious reason. Under any defini-
tion of the incorporation doctrine, the writing to which reference is made becomes a part of 
the paper making the reference. However, the list authorized by section 64.1-45.1 does not 
become a part of the testator's will and it is not admitted to probate in the clerk's office, 
but a copy must be furnished to the commissioner of accounts during the accounting proc-
ess. Id. A discussion of this list can be found in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Vir-
ginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 1175, 1185-86 (1995). In 1997 
the General Assembly extended a similar, but somewhat restricted, privilege to settlors of 
intervivos trusts. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-7.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001); see also Johnson, supra note 
51, at 126H5. 
71. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-45.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001). This section, entitled "Incorpora-
tion by reference; letter of instruction or memorandum into a will, power of attorney or 
trust instrument," states: 
A The following original documents may be incorporated by reference into a 
will, power of attorney or trust instrument: 
1. A letter or memorandum to the fiduciary or agent as to the interpretation 
of discretionary powers of distribution where the will, power of attorney or 
trust instrument provides the fiduciary or agent the power to make distribu-
tions to beneficiaries in the discretion of the fiduciary or agent; and 
2. A letter or memorandum stating the views or directions of the maker of 
the will, power of attorney or trust instrument as to the exercise of discretion 
by the fiduciary or agent in making health care decisions for the maker. 
B. No provision in the original document sought to be incorporated by refer-
ence under this section that contradicts or is inconsistent 'vith a provision of 
the incorporating will, power of attorney or trust instrument shall be en-
forced. 
C. This section shall not prevent the incorporation by reference of any writing 
into any other writing that would othenvise be effective under§ 64.1-45.1 or 
under any other law of incorporation by reference. 
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In summary, this puzzling statute appears to provide for the in-
corporation into wills, powers of attorney, and trust instruments 
of (1) "original documents," (2) that "may be prepared before or 
after" the execution of the incorporating document, and (3) that 
have been "signed and notarized," if the original documents relate 
to either "the interpretation of discretionary powers of distribu-
tion," or the maker's views or directions "as to the exercise of dis-
cretion by the fiduciary or agent in making health care deci-
sions."72 The primary question to be posed is ''Why was this 
statute enacted?" Privacy cannot be a goal because an incorpo-
rated document becomes a part of the original and thus, anyone 
entitled to a copy of the primary document would be entitled to a 
copy of anything incorporated therein. Legal efficacy cannot be a 
goal because, although incorporation by reference can be very 
helpful in some cases, knowledgeable estate planners would agree 
that if a decision regarding a fiduciary's exercise of discretion is 
made before the primary document is executed it should be stated 
therein, and if such a decision (or a contrary one) is made thereaf-
ter, it should be expressed in a new will, power of attorney, or 
trust agreement.73 For obvious reasons, simplicity, economy and 
convenience cannot be goals. 74 The one possible goal that can be 
envisioned is the creation of a mechanism for retaining a certain 
amount of control over distributions from an irrevocable inter vi-
vos trust by a post-execution ''letter or memorandum to the fidu-
ciary ... as to the interpretation of discretionary powers of distri-
bution."75 However, an irrevocable trust is typically utilized only 
Id. 
D. The documents referenced in subsection A shall be signed and notarized, 
and may be prepared before or after the execution of the will, power of attor-
ney or trust instrument. 
72. Id. 
73. The problem of contradictions and inconsistencies between original and recipient 
documents is recognized in Virginia Code section 64.l-45.2(B). See id. § 64.1-45.2(B) (Cum. 
Supp. 2001) (addressing contradiction). However, the easiest way to avoid the problem of 
reconciling conflicting documents, which occurs far too often, is to have only one document. 
Moreover, the one-document approach not only reduces the likelihood of litigation, but it 
also increases the likelihood that the client's goals will be accomplished. 
74. Once upon a time, when preparation of new documents was the laborious quill-pen 
task of scriveners, a genuine case could be made for codicils to wills and amendments to 
other lengthy documents. These considerations are absent in today's highly automated 
word-processing environment and thus, except in unusual cases, the knowledgeable estate 
planner finds it easier, faster, and better to execute a new document instead of attempting 
to modify an existing one. 
75. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-45.2(A)(l) (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
2001] WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 859 
when the settlor is seeking income and/or estate tax advantages, 
and it is clear that in such cases the settlor's possession of a 
power to control a trustee's discretionary distribution power will 
result in the loss of any income or estate tax benefit otherwise 
available to an irrevocable inter vivos trust.76 
In addition to the primary "why" question discussed above, a 
non-exclusive list of other concerns raised by this statute includes 
the following: (1) How does one employ this concept? The Su-
preme Court of Virginia has stated how the common law rule is 
employed, the statutory fiduciary-power exception states how it is 
employed, the analogous but different statutes dealing with dis-
position of tangible personal property at death state how they are 
employed, but the present statute is silent; (2) Why is the term 
"original documents" used, and what happens if no original 
document is found but a copy is?; (3) Why does this statute pro-
vide for incorporating letters or memoranda relating to health 
care decisions into a trust or will, neither of which relate to such 
matters and the latter of which does not become a legal document 
until after the testator has died and health care decisions can no 
longer be made?; (4) Why does this statute expressly state that 
instruments effective under section 64.1-45.1 shall not be nega-
tively affected by its provisions, but make no similar statement 
about the spiritual twin of section 64.1-45.1, section 55-7.2?; and 
(5) Why, if there is any good purpose to be served by this statute, 
will an intended incorporation thereunder fail if the original 
document sought to be incorporated is not notarized, notwith-
standing uncontradicted evidence of its authenticity? Giving such 
obeisance to a largely meaningless formality is totally out of step 
with reason and reality. 
In short, there appears to be only one good thing that can be 
said of this statute. It expressly states that "[t]his section shall 
not prevent the incorporation by reference of any writing into any 
other writing that would otherwise be effective under ... any 
other law of incorporation by reference."77 Thus, notwithstanding 
the problems presented by this statute, the Virginia lawyer may 
continue to use and rely upon the settled rules of prior law in all 
non-tax matters. However, because of the possible loss of income 
76. See I.R.C. § 674(a) (1994), as to income tax, and I.R.C. § 2038 (1994), as to estate 
tax. 
77. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.l-45.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
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and estate tax advantages associated with irrevocable inter vivos 
trusts, the prudent estate planner may wish to include a provi-
sion expressly renouncing this new incorporation power in any 
post-June 30, 2001, irrevocable trust instruments, and to suggest 
to clients who created irrevocable trusts prior to July 1, 2001, 
that they execute an instrument disclaiming or renouncing their 
after-the-fact acquisition of this power under the 2001 legislation. 
Taking all of this section's problems into account, in light of its 
failure to accomplish any purpose, it is submitted that the Gen-
eral Assembly, in its 2002 Session, should repeal, rather than at-
tempt to redraft, this statute. 
I. Certain Small Estates-Waiver of Inventory and Settlement 
Section 26-12.3, designed to facilitate the probate process in 
small estates, has provided that "[w]hen an estate does not ex-
ceed $10,000 in value, and an heir, beneficiary or creditor whose 
claim exceeds the value of the estate seeks qualification, the clerk 
shall waive inventory under § 26-12 and settlement under 
§ 26-17."78 The 2001 amendments to this section changed "an es-
tate" to "a personal estate under the supervision and control of 
the personal representative or curator," and added the further re-
quirement that "the personal representative or curator does not 
have the power of sale over real estate."79 
The initial portion of the first amendment, changing "an es-
tate" to a "personal estate" not exceeding $10,000, standing alone, 
would extend this section's operation because it would eliminate 
the value of any real estate from the computation. However, the 
complete language of the first amendment, "a personal estate un-
der the supervision and control of the personal representative or 
curator,"80 raises a major issue regarding the continuing viability 
78. Id.§ 26-12.3 (Cum. Supp. 2000) (prior to amendment). 
79. As amended, the statute reads as follows: 
When (i) a personal estate under the supervision and control of the personal 
representative or curator does not exceed $10,000 in value, (ii) the personal 
representative or curator does not have the power of sale over real estate, and 
(iii) an heir, beneficiary or creditor whose claim exceeds the value of the es-
tate seeks qualification, the clerk shall waive inventory under § 26-12 and 
settlement under § 26-17. 
Id.§ 26-12.3 (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
80. Id. 
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of this section's relief provisions because, if there is already a per-
sonal representative in existence under clause (i), why would an-
other person be seeking qualification under clause (iii)? Moreover, 
even if another should seek qualification in such a case, the clerk 
does not have the power to make such an appointment,81 so why 
state that "the clerk shall waive" inventory and settlement upon 
making the appointment that the clerk does not have the author-
ity to make?82 The further requirement added by the second 
amendment, that "the personal representative or curator does not 
have the power of sale over real estate,"83 adds to the confusion 
regarding this legislation because curators do not have a power of 
sale over real estate84 and an administrator would have that 
power only if granted by the circuit court.85 In addition, the first 
amendment's change of "an estate" to "a personal estate" creates 
an ambiguity regarding the meaning of "the estate" in clause 
(iii),86 and clause (iii) also refers to a non-existent"§ 26-17."87 Be-
cause of the uncertainties surrounding the application of this leg-
islation, it needs to be readdressed during the 2002 Session of the 
General Assembly. 
81. In Bolling v. D'Amato, 259 Va. 299, 526 S.E.2d 257 (2000), the court referred to 
the "ancient and settled rule" that "when an administrator had been appointed and quali-
fied, 'the power of the court or clerk is exhausted, and no further appointment can be made 
until a vacancy occurs in the office in some way recognized by law.'" Id. at 304, 526 S.E.2d 
at 259 (quoting Beavers v. Beavers, 185 Va. 418, 423, 39 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1946)). 
82. Of course, the court or clerk has the power to appoint an executor under a will 
that has been brought forward after the qualification of an administrator on an estate be-
lieved to be intestate, but the remedy of the section in question is aimed at the qualifica-
tion of"an heir, beneficiary or creditor whose claim exceeds the value of the estate." Com-
pare VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-12.3 (Repl. Vol. 2001), with id.§ 64.1-77 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
83. VA. CODE.ANN.§ 26-12.3 (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
84. The curator's role, however, is broader than that of an administrator because, al-
though the latter has no control over a decedent's real property by virtue of office, a cura-
tor "may lease or receive the rents and profits of any real estate whereof the decedent or 
testator may have died seized or possessed." Id.§ 64.1-93 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
85. Section 64.1-57.1 empowers the circuit court to grant "all or a part of such powers 
as may be incorporated by reference pursuant to§ 64.1-57." Id. § 64.1-57.1 (Cum. Supp. 
2001). One of these fiduciary powers is the power to sell real estate. Id. § 64.l-57(1)(b) 
(Cum. Supp. 2001). 
86. For example, when clause (iii) refers to "an heir, beneficiary or creditor whose 
claim exceeds the value of the estate," it is unclear whether "the estate" means the entire 
estate or only the personal estate. Id.§ 26-12.3 (Repl. Vol. 2001) (emphasis added). 
87. This section's reference to§ 26-17 has been incorrect since the latter was repealed 
in 1993. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 689, § 2, 1993 Va. Acts 969. The correct reference is VA. 
CODE ANN.§ 26-17.5 (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
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J. Small Estates-Waiver of Surety 
The general rule of section 26-4 allows a court or its clerk to 
waive surety upon the official bond of a personal representative, 
guardian, conservator or committee if the amount coming under 
the fiduciary's control does not exceed $10,000.88 However, when 
the General Assembly, in its 1983 Session, amended section 26-59 
to allow certain nonresidents to qualify as personal representa-
tives, it stipulated that bond with surety would be required "in 
every case ... unless a resident personal representative ... quali-
fies at the same time."89 It was believed important to have a 
surety on the bond of every nonresident acting as sole fiduciary in 
order that the commissioner of accounts and estate beneficiaries 
might have some leverage or control over these persons once they 
left the Commonwealth, taking estate assets with them. Thus, 
the "in every case" language of the 1983 legislation was intended 
to preclude the application of the small-estate waiver provision of 
section 26-4 to cases involving nonresident fiduciaries serving 
without a Virginia co-fiduciary. As time passed, and the General 
Assembly became more comfortable with the concept of nonresi-
dent fiduciaries serving alone, it partially relaxed the require-
ment of section 26-59 by permitting the circuit court to waive 
surety upon fiduciary bonds in accordance with the small estate 
provision of section 26-4.90 However, it refrained from extending 
this power to clerks of court. 
In the 2001 Session, the General Assembly amended section 
26-59 to extend this power to clerks of court. This amendment 
was contained in a lengthy omnibus bill, the official summary of 
which opens by stating that it "[m]akes technical correc-
tions ... that are not intended to create any substantive changes 
in policy."91 In regard to the specific amendment in question, the 
same source states that "an unintended conflict between the sec-
tion relating to nonresident fiduciaries and a section relating to 
the qualification of a fiduciary without security is eliminated by 
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-4 (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
89. Act of Mar. 27, 1983, ch. 467, 1983 Va. Acts 605 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 26-59(B) (Rep!. Vol. 1985)). 
90. Act of Apr. 6, 1996, ch. 680, 1996 Va. Acts 1179 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59 
(A) (Rep!. Vol. 2001)). 
91. S.B. 891, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Apr. 5, 2001, ch. 
836, 2001 Va. Acts 1173) (codified at VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-59 (Rep!. Vol. 2001)). 
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clarifying that the clerk may waive the surety when he ap-
points."92 It is submitted, however, that the change in question 
was substantive as opposed to technical and that the difference it 
eliminated was not "an unintended conflict." 
K. Wrongful Death or Personal Injury-Action Against Resident 
or Nonresident 
Section 64.1-75.1 provided that when a nonresident sought to 
be sued for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of acts 
occurring in Virginia has died, "an administrator of such person 
may be appointed [in Virginia], solely for the purpose of prosecu-
tion of said suit."93 In the 2001 Session, the General Assembly 
first broadened the applicability of this section by also making its 
remedy applicable to actions against estates of deceased resi-
dents.94 But then it restricted the section's applicability by limit-
ing it to a suit against a decedent "for whose estate an executor 
has not been appointed."95 It is difficult to believe that this legis-
lation was intended to require a Virginia plaintiff to prosecute a 
Virginia-origin suit against a deceased nonresident defendant in 
the nonresident's jurisdiction simply because an executor has 
been appointed there, but such is the literal language of the stat-
ute. Similarly, it is difficult to believe that this legislation was in-
tended to allow the appointment of an administrator "solely for 
the purpose of prosecution of' these suits even if a Virginia ad-
ministrator has already been appointed for a Virginia decedent's 
estate, but again such is the literal language of the statute.96 It is 
92. Id. 
93. VA. CODE.ANN.§ 64.1-75.1 (Repl. Vol.1995) (prior to amendment). 
94. Id.§ 64.1-75.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
95. Id. 
96. The statute allows the appointment of this administrator "for the sole purpose" of 
suit except when an executor has been appointed. It is possible that this legislation was 
meant as a response to Bolling v. D'Amato, 259 Va. 299, 526 S.E.2d 257 (2000), where one 
interpretation of the Court's decision suggested that a practice might have developed of 
appointing administrators "for the sole purpose" of suit even though the clerk had already 
appointed an administrator, notwithstanding any legal justification for such an appoint-
ment. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1088. However, if the purpose of the legislation was to 
legitimate the appointment of an administrator "for the sole purpose" of suit when an ad-
ministrator of the estate had already been appointed, it is difficult to see why such a pos-
sibility would not also be legitimated if the personal representative already qualified on 
the decedent's estate happened to be an executor instead of an administrator. 
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submitted that this legislation needs to be readdressed and clari-
fied in the 2002 Session. 
L. Personal Representatives-Suits by or Against 
Section 64.1-144, the entire text of which provided that "[a] 
personal representative may sue or be sued upon any judgment 
for or against or any contract of or with his decedent,"97 was 
amended by adding the following language to its end: "including, 
but not limited to, suits for personal injury or wrongful death."98 
It is not clear why this amendment was believed to be necessary 
but, if it was, logic would suggest that provision should also be 
made for tort actions where neither personal injury nor death is 
involved. Thus, this legislation needs to be added to the list of 
2001 enactments requiring further action in the 2002 Session. 
M. Fiduciary Bonds-Execution by Agent 
Section 26-3, dealing with fiduciary bonds, provided that any 
fiduciary required to post additional bond or a new bond must 
personally appear before the court or clerk to make the required 
oath and sign the necessary paperwork.99 This procedure has be-
come more inconvenient since Virginia relaxed its fiduciary quali-
fication laws and increasing numbers of non-Virginians have be-
gun serving in a variety of fiduciary capacities. In response to the 
travel, time, and expense problems presented by requiring a fidu-
ciary's personal appearance in bond matters, the General Assem-
bly amended section 26-3 to authorize "the fiduciary's execution 
[of a new, additional, or reduction in, bond] to be made by the fi-
duciary's agent under a power of attorney expressly authorizing 
the same."100 
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-144 (Repl. Vol. 1995) (prior to amendment). 
98. Id.§ 64.1-144 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
99. Id. § 26-3 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (prior to amendment). 
100. Id.§ 26-3(B) (Repl. Vol. 2001). This legislation also made clarifying changes to VA. 
CODE ANN. § 26-3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
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N. Commissioners of Accounts-Duties of Assistant 
Commissioners 
865 
Section 26-10, dealing with the appointment, duties, and pow-
ers of assistant commissioners, has been somewhat ambiguous in 
regard to those duties and powers. This ambiguity is eliminated 
by the 2001 amendment, which provided that "[o]n all qualifica-
tions after June 30, 2001, assistant commissioners of accounts 
shall act only in such cases as the commissioner of accounts dele-
gates to him. "101 
0. Trusts-Trustee Hiatus-Who to Execute 
Section 26-51 deals with who is to execute a trust in a variety 
of circumstances, such as when a trustee dies, resigns, becomes 
incapacitated, or is confined, and a replacement has not yet been 
appointed.102 This section was rewritten by the General Assembly 
to clarify its operation and to make it grammatically correct.103 No 
substantive changes were made.104 
P. Notice of Probate-Affidavit of No Notice Required 
The General Assembly, in its 1993 Session, created section 
64.1-122.2 to provide for a form of after-the-fact notice of probate 
to interested parties in response to a concern that Virginia's ex 
parte probate process did not comply with the minimum notice 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.105 To ensure com-
pliance, this section requires the party charged with giving notice 
thereunder to file an affidavit in the clerk's office "stating the 
names and addresses of the persons to whom he has mailed or de-
livered notice and when the notice was mailed or delivered to 
each,"106 and prohibits the commissioner of accounts from approv-
lOL Id.§ 26-10 (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
102. Id. § 26-51 (Cum. Supp. 2000) (prior to amendment). 
103. Compare id. § 26-51 (Repl. Vol. 2001), with id. § 26-51 (Cum. Supp. 2000). 
104. Id. § 26-51 (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
105. Act of Feb. 9, 1993, ch. 4, 1993 Va. Acts 3 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-122.2 
(Repl. Vol. 1995)); see also Johnson, supra note 30, at 833-35. 
106. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-122.2(F) (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
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ing an account until this affidavit has been filed. 107 A minor prob-
lem has developed under this compliance provision in those cases 
where notice is not required to be given to anyone. In such cases 
an affidavit that notice was given cannot be filed and, in the ab-
sence of such an affidavit, some commissioners would not approve 
an account. To resolve this impasse, the General Assembly 
amended the compliance provision to require either the filing of 
the affidavit of notice given or an affidavit "that the name and 
address of the person to whom notice is required" cannot be 
found. 108 
Q. Wills-Recordation-Certified Copy 
Section 64.1-94, addressing the recordation of wills, was 
amended to clarify that a "duly certified copy'' of a will includes a 
copy "prepared from [a] microfilmed or electronic record and certi-
fied as authentic by the clerk or his designee."109 
R. Charitable Trusts-Charitable Corporations as Trustees 
Although Virginia law prohibits any legal entity from engaging 
in the trust business without a certificate of authority from the 
State Corporation Commission, 110 anecdotal evidence presented 
during the 2001 Session indicated that some schools and other 
charitable entities were in fact serving as trustees of their own 
pooled income funds and split-interest trusts in which they were 
one of the beneficiaries. Seeing no harm in such a practice, the 
General Assembly amended section 6.1-32.12,111 dealing with ex-
emptions to the general prohibition, by adding language that 
"[c]larifies and validates the existing practice."112 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id.§ 64.1-94 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
110. Id.§ 6.1-32.13 (Repl. Vol. 1999). 
111. Id.§ 6.1-32.12(7) (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
112. H.B. 1730, Summary as introduced, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted 
as Act of Mar. 26, 2001, ch. 717, 2001 Va. Acts 968). 
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S. International Wills-Registry System 
In 1995, the General Assembly enacted the Uniform Interna-
tional Wills Act.113 In the 2001 Session, the General Assembly 
made a ministerial amendment to the section dealing with Vir-
ginia's registry system for international wills by changing the 
term "Secretary of State" (an office that does not exist in Vir-
ginia), to "Secretary of the Commonwealth."114 
T. Intestate Succession-Appointment of Administrator-
Priorities 
The basic rule of section 64.1-118 has been to give a surviving 
spouse the first priority in qualifying on a decedent's intestate es-
tate and, in the absence of a spouse who wishes and is able to 
qualify, to allow administration to be granted to "such of the oth-
ers entitled to distribution as the court or clerk shall see fit."115 
This latter provision has resulted in what some have referred to 
as a "race to the courthouse" that has led to undesirable results in 
some cases. Accordingly, House Bill 1732 was introduced to 
eliminate the race aspect of this statute.116 However, notwith-
standing the General Assembly's passage of this bill, a guberna-
torial amendment accepted during the 2001 Special Session pro-
vided "[t]hat the provisions of this act shall not become effective 
unless reenacted by the 2002 Session of the General Assembly 
and signed by the Governor."117 The Governor did not state his 
reasons for this amendment; they remain unknown at the time of 
this publication. 
113. Act of Mar. 20, 1995, ch. 443, 1995 Va. Acts 637 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 64.1-96.2 to -96.11 (Repl. Vol. 1995)); see UNIF. PROBATE CODE, art. II, pt. 10, 8 U.L.A. 
191 (1995); see also Johnson, supra note 70, at 1190. 
114. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-96.11 (Cum Supp. 2001). 
115. Id.§ 64.1-118 (Cum. Supp. 2000) (prior to amendment). 
116. H.B. 1732, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 
795, 2001 Va. Acts 1084) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-118 (Cum. Supp. 
2001)). 
117. Act of Apr. 9, 2001, ch. 795, 2001 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 64.1-118 (Cum. Supp. 2001)). 
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III. SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA DECISION 
A. Estate Administration-Section 64.1-57 Powers-Reliance 
The primary issue before the court in Roberts v. Roberts118 was 
"whether Code § 64.1-57(1)(k)119 insulates a fiduciary against a 
claim of negligence in the preparation and filing of an estate tax 
return by an 'agent or professional representative."'120 Shortly af-
ter S qualified as executor on T's estate he determined that this 
undertaking was beyond his level of competence and, pursuant to 
the above-referenced power incorporated by reference in T's will, 
he retained Bank as his agent to provide the necessary expertise 
and services in the administration of T's estate.121 One service 
provided by Bank was the preparation of an estate tax return for 
T's estate, on which Bank failed to include certain bonds that had 
been found in a safe deposit box owned jointly by S and T.122 S 
claimed to own these bonds by way of gifts from T.123 Although S 
signed the return prepared by Bank, S "did not read such return, 
expecting same to be correct."124 Following the settlement of tax 
claims based upon the noninclusion of the bonds, estate benefici-
aries brought an action against S seeking to recover the amount 
their expected inheritances had been reduced because of the addi-
tional payments to federal and state tax authorities.125 The com-
missioner in chancery to whom the trial court refeITed this mat-
118. 260 Va. 660, 536 S.E.2d 714 (2000). 
119. When incorporated by reference into a will or trust, or granted to an administrator 
in intestacy, this subsection empowers a fiduciary: 
To employ and compensate, out of the principal or the income or both as to 
the fiduciary shall seem proper, agents, accountants, brokers, attorneys-in-
fact, attorneys-at-law, tax specialists, licensed real estate brokers, licensed 
salesmen and other assistants and advisors deemed by the fiduciary needful 
for the proper administration of the trust or estate, and to do so without li-
ability for any neglect, omission, misconduct, or default of any such agent or 
professional representative provided he was selected and retained with rea-
sonable care. 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-57(1)(k) (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
120. Roberts, 260 Va. at 662, 536 S.E.2d at 715. 
121. Id. at 663, 536 S.E.2d at 716. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 664, 536 S.E.2d at 716. 
124. Id. at 669, 536 S.E.2d at 719. 
125. A secondary issue in this case focused on S's alleged negligence in failing to sue 
Bank to recover this amount for the estate. See id. at 666, 670, 536 S.E.2d at 719-20. The 
trial court's affirmative response was reversed. See id. at 670, 536 S.E.2d at 720. 
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ter found that S selected and relied upon [Bank] because of its 
expertise and that S "fully informed [Bank] of the facts necessary 
to prepare the tax return for the estate."126 Nevertheless, the 
commissioner reported, and the trial court held, that S owed T's 
estate a duty to review the tax return in detail and that S "did not 
use 'reasonable care and skill' when he blindly relied upon" 
Bank.121 
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in reversing the trial 
court, noted that "Code § 64.1-57(1)(k) would be rendered mean-
ingless if a fiduciary could hire an agent whose expertise is essen-
tial to managing an estate or trust and then be held liable for re-
lying on the expertise provided by that agent."128 The court's 
review of the evidence disclosed no negligence on S's part in se-
lecting or retaining Bank as his agent, and it concluded that 
"[h]is reliance upon the bank's work was not 'blind'; rather, it re-
flected the sort of reliance anticipated by Code § 64.l-57(1)(k), 
which contemplates the situation where a fiduciary does not have 
the ability to perform this function himself."129 
IV. VIRGINIA CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS 
A. Augmented Estate-Exclusions-Gifts to Decedent-Proceeds 
The issue before the court in In re Estate of Seitz130 was 
whether a certain farm purchased by a testatrix and owned at her 
death should be included in her augmented estate.131 Testatrix's 
executor and children claimed they might be able to establish at 
trial that the funds used by Testatrix to purchase the farm were 
received by gift or inheritance from her former husband.132 How-
ever, on a motion in limine, the court held that such evidence 
"would be irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the 
farm is included in the augmented estate."133 The court further 
126. Id. at 669, 536 S.E.2d at 719. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 669-70, 536 S.E.2d at 719. 
130. No. 99-47-01, 2000 WL 890737 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 23, 2000). 
13L Id. at *l. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at '~2. 
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explained that if evidence was offered to show that the farm itself 
had been received gratuitously, then the farm would be excluded 
from Testatrix's augmented estate pursuant to Virginia Code sec-
tion 64.1-16.l(B), but "[i]f, however, merely the money which 
[Testatrix] used to purchase the farm was 'received' . . . [gratui-
tously], then the farm would not be excluded from the augmented 
estate."134 Another way of stating the court's conclusion is that 
the exclusion in question extends only to the original gifted prop-
erty and not to its proceeds. 
Although the court quoted from the code section that states the 
correct answer to the question before it, the court failed to quote 
the controlling provision in its entirety. Two of the words omitted 
by the court would have led it to the opposite, and correct, holding 
in this case. The relevant provision reads in full as follows: 
"Nothing herein shall cause to be included in the augmented es-
tate ... (ii) the value of any property, its income or proceeds, received 
by the decedent by gift, will, intestate succession, or any other 
method or form of transfer to the extent it is received without full 
consideration in money or money's worth, before or during the mar-
riage to the surviving spouse ... to the extent such property, income, 
or proceeds were maintained by the decedent as separate property.135 
B. Augmented Estate-Exclusions-Date of Transfer 
The issue believed to be controlling in In re Estate of 
Swecker,136 was whether Decedent conveyed certain farm prop-
erty to a family partnership before or after August 15, 1987, the 
date of his marriage to the surviving spouse who, upon his death, 
elected to take her augmented estate rights in his estate.137 This 
determination was based upon section 64.1-16.l(A)(3), which in-
cludes in a decedent's augmented estate certain tainted transfers 
made "during the marriage to the surviving spouse."138 The sur-
viving spouse argued that the transfer to the family partnership 
134. Id. at *l. 
135. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-16.l(B)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). 
136. No. 150600, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 361 (Cir. Ct. Aug. 7, 2000) (Fairfax County). This 
citation is to the court's opinion letter which is incorporated by reference into the court's 
final decree of August 25, 2000, as "Exhibit B." The Report of the Special Commissioner in 
Chancery, to be referred to later, was incorporated into the final decree as "Exhibit A." 
137. See Report of Special Commissioner in Chancery at 5, 7. 
138. VA. CODE.ANN.§ 64.1-16.l(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
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was not made until October 27, 1987, the date the deed in ques-
tion was recorded, which was more than two months after her 
marriage to Decedent.139 Relying upon the report of the special 
commissioner in chancery to whom this matter was referred, the 
court held that the farm property in question was transferred af-
ter August 14, 1987, and thus was included in Decedent's aug-
mented estate.140 
Neither the court nor the commissioner discussed another pro-
vision of Virginia's augmented estate law which, if applicable, 
would have led to a contrary conclusion. The relevant provision 
reads in full as follows: "Nothing herein shall cause to be included 
in the augmented estate ... (iii) any transfer made to anyone 
other than the surviving spouse prior to January 1, 1991, to the 
extent that such transfer is irrevocable on that date."141 Although 
Decedent had certain rights in the family partnership to which 
the farm property was conveyed, it appears from the facts recited 
in the commissioner's report that the conveyance itself was ir-
revocable on October 27, 1987.142 Further, the law is clear that a 
pre-January 1, 1991 irrevocable transfer is excluded from the 
transferor's augmented estate even if it is made during the mar-
riage dissolved by the transferor's death.143 
C. Rule Against Perpetuities-Applicability of Correct Version 
The issue before the court in Richards v. Maiden, 144 was the va-
lidity of Testatrix's residuary trust created for "the educational 
benefit of all of my grandchildren."145 Testatrix was survived by 
four children and three grandchildren, and the court found that, 
as she intended to provide for ''her present and future born 
grandchildren," the residuary trust violated the rule against per-
petuities.146 The court's decision would have been correct if the 
common law Rule Against Perpetuities had governed this case, 
139. See Report of Special Commissioner in Chancery at 5-6. 
140. Swecker, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 361, at *1-2. 
141. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-16.l(B)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). 
142. See Report of Special Commissioner in Chancery at 6. 
143. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-16.l(B)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
144. No. CH99-17404, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 494 (Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2000) (Rockingham 
County). 
145. Id. at ~'l. 
146. Id. at *2. 
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but it did not. Virginia abandoned the common law "might have 
been" rule in favor of a statutory "wait and see" rule in 1982. 147 
Under a common law "might have been" analysis, the residuary 
trust would be void ab initio because of the possibility that a right 
might be acquired by an after-born grandchild more that twenty-
one years following the death of the last life in being at Testa-
trix's death. However, the governing statutory "wait and see" rule 
provides that "a transfer of an interest in property fails, if the in-
terest does not vest, if it ever vests, within the period of the rule 
against perpetuities."148 Under this statutory rule, instead of 
making a decision based on future possibilities at the time the 
trust becomes irrevocably operative, one waits to see what actu-
ally happens during the perpetuity period.149 If the contingency in 
question is in fact resolved before lives in being and twenty-one 
years have passed, the interest is deemed valid.150 If the contin-
gency is not resolved within this period, then instead of a declara-
tion of invalidity as under the common law rule, the statutory 
rule directs the court to reform the trust under cy pres principles 
at that future time.151 Lastly, although the court applied the 
common law rule to determine the validity of Testatrix's residu-
ary trust, it applied the statutory cy pres power under section 
55-13.3(B) after finding the trust to be void.152 If the common law 
rule had been the governing rule in this case then, upon finding 
the residuary trust to be void, the property in question should 
have passed to Testatrix's heirs by intestate succession.153 
147. See Act of Apr. 7, 1982, ch. 249, 1982 Va. Acts 399 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 55-13.3 (Rep!. Vol. 1995)). Although the 2000 Session adopted a version of the Uniform 
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, and an ill-conceived and problem-plagued provision 
intended to allow one to "opt-out" of the Rule Against Perpetuities in certain cases, the 
1982 "wait and see" rule was retained as the governing rule for "all donative interests cre-
ated on or after July 1, 1982, and before July 1, 2000." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3(B)(i) 
(Cum. Supp. 2001). These developments are discussed in Johnson, supra note 2, at 1069-
74. The court's decision does not mention the date of Testatrix's death, but a copy of the 
clerk's order probating Testatrix's will states that it was January 31, 1998. 
148. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-13.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
149. See id. 
150. See id. 
151. Id. A more complete discussion of the 1982 perpetuities legislation can be found in 
J. Rodney Johnson, The Transformation of the Rule Against Perpetuities in Virginia, 
NEWSLETTER, (T. C. Williams Sch. of Law, Univ. ofRichmond, Va.) Oct. 1982, at 10. 
152. Richards v. Maiden, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 494, at *4 (Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2000) (Rock-
ingham County). 
153. Id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
873 
For the reasons recited herein, it is respectfully submitted that 
the 2002 Session of the Virginia General Assembly should (1) cor-
rect the drafting errors in the 2001 legislation dealing with notice 
and copies of inventories, accountings, and wills, 154 waiver of in-
ventory and settlement in small estates, 155 wrongful death or per-
sonal injury actions against deceased residents or nonresidents, 156 
and suits by or against personal representatives;157 (2) repeal the 
misbegotten incorporation by reference statute;158 and (3) impose 
due process notice provisions on testamentary trustees, conserva-
tors of incapacitated persons, and guardians of minors that are 
comparable to those imposed on personal representatives.159 
154. See supra Part II.A 
155. See supra Part II.I. 
156. See supra Part II.K 
157. See supra Part II.L. 
158. See supra Part II.H. 
159. See supra Part II.A 
